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ABSTRACT – Theories of concepts and concept acquisition are mutually 
constraining. How we envisage concept acquisition depends both on what 
we take concepts to be and what skills we can employ to acquire them. I 
argue that Ned Block’s cognitivist approach to concept acquisition is not 
compatible with his vision of conceptual role semantics. If concepts are 
defined by their conceptual roles, then the acquisition of new concepts 
will change the conceptual roles of concepts employed in any form of 
hypothesis formation and confirmation learning. This breaks the evidentiary 
link between the concepts acquired and the evidence used to justify its 
subsequent applications. As a consequence, conceptual role semantics 
cannot avail itself of cognitivist approaches to concept acquisition. Despite 
this, they may nevertheless explain the apparent rational nature of much 
concept acquisition.
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RESUMO – Teorias dos conceitos e da aquisição de conceitos são mutua- 
mente vinculados. O modo como encaramos a aquisição de conceitos 
depende tanto do que tomamos por conceitos e das habilidades que em- 
pregamos para adquiri-los. Eu argumento que a abordagem cognitivista da 
aquisição de novos conceitos proposta por Ned Block não é compatível com a 
sua concepção semântica de papel conceitual. Se os conceitos são definidos 
pelos seus papéis conceituais, então a aquisição de novos conceitos mudará 
os papéis conceituais de conceitos empregados em qualquer forma de 
formação de hipótese e de aprendizagem de confirmação. Isso quebra a co- 
nexão que evidencia entre conceitos adquiridos e a evidência utilizada para 
justificar suas aplicações subsequentes. Consequentemente, a semântica 
de papel conceitual não pode beneficiar-se das abordagens cognitivistas 
para a aquisição de conceitos. A despeito disso, elas podem, entretanto, 
explicar a natureza aparentemente racional da aquisição de conceitos.
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Cognitivismo. Concepção semântica.
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Taking on the problem of meaning, or the nature of linguistic or 
mental representation, is no minor task. Modern theories of meaning 
have done much to chart out specific proposals about how individual 
tokens or symbols, instantiated in mind or language, may come to 
represent or in some sense “stand for” particular individuals or states of 
affairs. 
Posing the question in modern naturalist garb, Blackburn writes, “[h]
ow is it even possible for a world – a natural world of things in space and 
time, of flesh and blood – to contain some things that represent other 
things?” (BLACKBURN, 1984, 39) Blackburn’s question is at once about 
the metaphysical nature of representation and, in flesh and blood, the 
human capacity to employ it. We may say that in the first part the question 
is about what makes representation possible and in the second it is how 
we make it actual. If, as some might claim, representation is not a property 
of human minds, then the first question is considerably less interesting.1 
But even granting this, we may suppose that how humans represent can 
only be part of the story about the nature of representation, since we are 
only one of many possible representation systems. However, if we are 
impressed, as Blackburn is, by the existence of meaningful expressions 
and thoughts in the physical world, then the goal of theory of a theory 
of meaning will be to explain how meaningful states are instantiated in 
this world, how they can be naturalized. A naturalized semantics is thus 
interested in more than how representation is possible. It is interested in 
how representation emerges from the physical world and how, ultimately, 
it is reducible to it. 
In some ways, this analysis reverses the script. We are not simply 
spelling out the nature of meaning based on an analysis of the nature of 
representation. Instead, we can work backwards from the constraints on 
human representational capacities to determine the adequacy of theories 
of meaning more generally. 
Hence, these accounts can be instructive. Most theories of mental 
representation are steeped in the language of concepts (see, for example, 
FODOR, 1981; PEACOCKE, 1992). A concept functions as a semantic 
atom, much like a word in a language. It is through the concatenation 
and combination of concepts (according to some pseudo-grammatical 
rules of combination) that we may describe particular states of affairs.   
 
1  In recent years, this assumption has begun to encounter some significant scrutiny. While 
no current account does away with representation, recent work in dynamical systems 
theory and embodiment have threatened to undermine standard representational 
accounts of cognition. Even so, such views remain controversial both in terms of their 
critiques and the representational properties of their competing accounts. See, for 
example, Wheeler (2005) for one such account.J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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Concepts, on this model, underlie our capacity for systematic and   
productive thought. On these terms, then, a theory of concepts is at the 
heart of a theory of representation. In this paper, I want to look at one 
further constraint: concept acquisition. 
A theory of concept acquisition mediates between two goals. On 
the one hand, a theory of concept acquisition must prove amenable to 
some account of what it is to have states with a specific representational 
content. As Christopher Peacocke notes, questions of concept possession 
are logically prior to questions of concept acquisition (see PEACOCKE, 
1992, ix). Our theory of how we acquire a concept will depend on what 
we think concepts are. But a theory of concept acquisition must also 
negotiate a path between these constraints on the nature of concepts 
and the empirically determined constraints of a theory of instantiation. 
We cannot accept a constitutive theory of concepts that makes the 
possession of these concepts impossible. If your theory says that 
concepts are bowling balls, then, short of discovering bigger heads (or 
smaller bowling balls), we don’t have any concepts. These constraints 
are sharpened within a theory of concept acquisition, for not only must 
we offer a credible picture of the instantiation of a given model of concept 
possession we must also show that there is some possible progression 
of steps by which we come to instantiate these states. Naturalism 
commits us to the view that any theory of this progression must also 
be empirically credible. The bowling ball theory, for example, may be 
implausible based on the size of our heads; it is even more so based on 
the possible avenues into them. 
Semantic Holism
Navigating between these competing demands has defined much 
of the debate about the nature of concepts. In this paper, I will examine 
what has been perhaps the dominant approach to the naturalization of 
mental representations: inferential role semantics. Proponents of this 
view have maintained that it is fundamentally the logical or causal 
relationships between mental representations that account for the 
semantic properties of mental states. Variants of this view can be 
traced as far as Wittgenstein’s claim that meaning is a function of how 
a symbol is used. However, there has been a broad proliferation of 
theories corresponding to different ways of defining the circumstances 
of use and the relations between mental representations within specific 
systems. These can range from Brandom’s (1994) profoundly normative 
and social account of these relations to psychological accounts of 
concepts in terms of the interrelation of theoretical terms in a child’s J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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emerging scientific understanding of the world (GOPNIK and MELTZOFF, 
1997). 
The focus of this discussion will be Ned Block’s (1986) justly famous 
paper, An Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology. Block’s theory 
remains relevant in this discussion both because of its seminal nature – 
few inferential roles theories developed today have not been influenced 
by the main tenets of Block’s account – and because, unlike many other 
versions of this view, Block is steadfast in holding that any theory of 
meaning must be, in his words, “psychologically relevant”. It must not 
only explain how representation is possible, but it must also render 
potential explanations of the causal role and efficacy of states with 
representational properties. He writes, “a psychologically relevant theory 
of meaning ought to illuminate the connections between knowing/under-
standing/learning and usage, on the one hand, and meaning on the other” 
(BLOCK, 1986, 618). 
It is in An Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology that Block 
looks to develop his psychologically relevant theory. He argues that there 
is reason to believe that it is only a conceptual role semantics that could 
satisfy the competing demands of a theory of meaning and a theory of 
instantiation. Towards this end, Block develops and defends a version of 
conceptual role semantics that is committed to a number of specific claims 
about the nature of mental representation and its role in human cognition. 
Block is, however, careful to note that his account should not be viewed 
as a theory in itself, but rather as “more of a framework for a theory…” 
(BLOCK, 1986, 620). Nevertheless, despite the schematic nature of this 
account, Block develops and defends several specific claims about both 
the nature of a conceptual role theory of meaning and its instantiation. 
Amongst the most central of these involve Block’s commitment to a theory 
of concept acquisition that he suggests is compatible with the demands 
of both his semantic theory and his theory of instantiation. In this paper, 
I will argue that Block’s theory fails to live up to its advertised virtues, 
that it does, in fact, run afoul of the twin constraints that theories of 
concept acquisition face. How concepts are acquired, on Block’s view, 
is not compatible with his picture of the nature of concepts and concept 
possession. Even so, I will maintain that Block’s theory might be revived 
with little change to the spirit of the original. 
In what follows, I will take a closer look at both the demands of 
conceptual role semantics and the various approaches to acquisition 
with which it has been thought compatible. In the final section, I will 
examine Block’s account of how concepts are acquired within his own 
theory. The remainder of the paper is taken up with an analysis of these 
views. J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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A.  Conceptual Role Semantics, the short course
Conceptual role semantics was developed first and perhaps most 
plausibly as a theory of meaning for logical terms or constants. The basic 
idea is that the functions described by logical operators could be defined 
strictly in terms of the inferences in which they participated. The meaning 
of a logical term was thus a function of the set of valid inferences that 
could be drawn from sentences in which it appeared. Take, for example, 
a logical term #. How we read the sentence, “The grass is green # the 
sky is blue,” will depend on what role we take the connective to have. 
Suppose for instance that we take it to be either the biconditional or 
conjunction. Determining the adequacy of either reading appears to 
depend on what inferences we are allowed to draw from sentences in 
which the connective figures. If it is permissible, for example, to infer that 
“The sky is blue” from the previous sentence then we can suppose, with 
confidence, that # does not represent disjunction or the biconditional – 
and we can get closer to the answer if we know what we may also infer 
that “the grass is green”. 
We would, however, be mistaken if we supposed that these inferences 
function as a sort of evidence for claims about the logical role of the term 
tokened in these sentences. What is central to a conceptual role approach 
to logical terms is that what a given sign or term means is not merely 
evidenced by its role in inferences, but rather it is constituted by this role. 
The meaning of a given connective is given by its role in determining the 
truth conditions of the inferences in which it participates. 
The advantages of such an approach to logical terms are substantial. 
On the one hand the theory offers an account of logical terms that 
presupposes no representational primitives beyond those that comprise 
the nonlogical vocabulary of the conceptual system in which it 
participates.2 As a consequence, inferential role theories offer welcome 
relief to those attempting to find an appropriate reduction base for logical 
terms and concepts. Moreover, even if we can’t reduce logical concepts to 
a more fundamental nonlogical vocabulary, we can nevertheless provide 
an exhaustive overview of what determines the meaning of any logical   
 
2  This does not mean, however, that there are no primitives within the theory. What is 
required are nonconceptual primitives which govern the transitions in the inferences that 
are made. Our inferential abilities are built out of simple, nonrepresentational, reasoning 
skills which underlie our capacity to make the appropriate inferences. Peacocke has 
called these basic inferences primitively compelling, because it is central to this account 
that the individual find these transitions compelling, but also not answerable to any 
other inferential process, nor subject to any other proof procedure. See Peacocke (1992, 
6). See also Ned Block (1986, 641) for a similar approach. In procedural semantics, these 
operations are often called “primitive instructions”. See John Haugeland (1989, 66).J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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connective. Since every inference in which a term participates is itself 
partially constitutive of its functional role, there can be no applications 
of the term, within the language, that go against its putative meaning. 
What is perhaps most appealing about this approach, however, is 
the short work it makes of definitions. For while logical terms faced 
difficulties within a reduction base of empirical concepts, the overarching 
problem with classical theories of concepts was the inability to provide 
the requisite conceptual analyses. Since on conceptual role theories 
terms are not reducible to other more basic terms, there is no requirement 
that conceptual analysis reveal an underlying conceptual structure for 
individual concepts. Hence, the theory requires neither the definitions, 
nor the primitives in which to couch them, that proponents of the classical 
theory of concepts found so difficult to provide. As a consequence, many 
philosophers have supposed that a more broadly construed conceptual 
role semantics might effectively contend with the problems that have 
confronted analyses of other kinds of concepts. Such an approach would 
offer an alternative to a reductionist empiricist theory as well as a radical 
nativism about primitive concepts.3 At its limit, this approach has been 
adopted by many as a general theory of conceptual content (though 
often as part of what has been called a “dual aspect” semantics, see 
McGinn, 1982).
How would such a theory work? There are many different views on 
how to approach this issue. Most argue, however, that it wouldn’t be 
much different than the theory given for logical terms and concepts. 
Conceptual role would be defined in terms of a concept’s inferential 
or causal role within the larger economy of nonlogical terms. On some 
views, the conceptual role of a term or concept is specified in terms of the 
dispositional inferential role of the concept. In other words, the meaning 
of a term is given by the inferences that one is apt to make with respect to 
sentences or thoughts that include that term. On most views, the relevant 
dispositional relations between sentences are not governed strictly by 
deductive inferences, as they are for logical terms. Instead, these theories 
tend to include inductive inferential relationships in demarcating the 
content of a given term or concept, whereas still others cleave to the 
view that any causal relationship between tokened sentences or thoughts 
are relevant to fixing the meaning of the terms which comprise them. 
The move towards a more inclusive inferential or causal apparatus is   
 
3  I am moving pretty freely here between a conceptual role semantics for terms in natural 
language and a conceptual role theory for concepts. I think nothing is lost in this 
translation. In particular, a CRS for natural language terms specifies that the meaning 
of the terms is exhausted by the inferences an individual makes or might make involving 
a given term. The same is true for a CRS for concepts. J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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necessitated by the view that deductive inferences alone do not cut finely 
enough to grant unique inferential roles to concepts we would otherwise 
regard as distinct. Tautalogies are true in every possible world, but clearly 
they do not mean the same thing in those worlds. As a consequence, 
a more nuanced and inferentially comprehensive approach has been 
considered necessary. 
Since it is only sentences or propositions that participate in inferences, 
the conceptual role of a given term or concept would be defined in terms 
of its contribution to the conceptual role of sentences or thoughts in 
which it figures. Usually, conceptual role is defined counterfactually – 
given not strictly in terms of the inferences in which a given concept 
participates so much as that role it would play if it were tokened. The 
inferential role of a concept can thus be specified not only in terms of the 
inferences that an agent actually makes, but also in terms of inferences 
that would be prompted under circumstances that have not occurred or 
do not currently obtain.4
Perhaps the central difference between a conceptual role theories 
of logical terms and concepts and the broader account of concepts 
sought after here is the relative difference in our ability to specify the 
component inferences that give the meaning of these terms. Since the 
logical terms form a closed set of interdefinable functions, it is fairly 
easy to demarcate what inferential properties are indicative of which 
functions. One can define, for example, the material conditional in terms 
of negation and conjunction, and conjunction in terms of negation and 
the material conditional, etc. Similar definitions are available for the 
quantifiers as well as modal operators. In these cases, then, one can 
straightforwardly isolate the conceptual role of the terms and concepts 
involved by merely adjudicating the inferences in which the concepts 
participate.5 The same is not true for our broader theory. Nonlogical 
terms and concepts participate in a seemingly endless array of actual or 
possible inferences that appear relevant to determining their conceptual 
role. Take, for instance, the concept UNLOVEABLE.6 In many instances, 
this concept may be associated with inferences concerning one’s looks, 
financial status, religion, ethnicity, sense of humour, hair and/or eye   
 
4  It remains unclear whether conceptual role should be understood in terms of idealized 
reasoning capacities or rather in terms of what people actually do. I won’t distinguish 
between these views for the purpose of this discussion, though the former may prove 
difficult to square with our naturalism.
5  The point is not that we can offer for any particular logical term a succinct definition 
of its conceptual role, but rather that we can specify for each logical term a finite set 
of inferences which exhaust the transitions which that term licenses. 
6  I will follow the convention that references to concepts be placed in capitals. J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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colour, sleep patterns, tastes in music, art, movies, shoe size, etc. It is 
an all too common practice to infer from, say, X is a graduate student, to 
X is unloveable. If we are to count each of the inferential associations of 
a given concept as a determinant of the meaning of that concept then 
the task of isolating the inferential role of these concepts, of determining 
what constitutes their meaning, appears impossibly complex.7
The complexity of this problem does not, however, imply that it is in 
principle impossible to specify the inferential associations, or liaisons, of 
a given concept. However, even if we can supply the requisite analyses of 
inferential properties of a given conceptual role, it remains unclear as to 
which of these properties are essential to the possession and acquisition 
of the concept itself. Consider again the concept UNLOVEABLE. The 
inferences I am prepared to make from statements involving this concept 
may differ greatly from yours, so much so that we might believe that 
our concepts of love are almost unrecognizably distinct. The same may 
hold for my future selves. After all, our tastes change as we age – and 
thus not only what is lovable to me at one time might seem banal and 
insipid at another, but, it appears, what I mean by lovable, or unloveable 
will also change. Insofar as we allow alteration and expansion within 
our inferential equations, we seem to be adopting different concepts. If 
there are aspects of the inferential role of your concept UNLOVEABLE 
that differ from the inferential role of my concept, does that mean we 
have different concepts?
Some conceptual role semanticists have argued that it doesn’t show 
that there are different concepts at work, merely different inferential 
liaisons attached to the same concept. Christopher Peacocke has 
championed a version of this view. He argues that there is a criterion, 
the Fregean criterion of informativeness, which allows us to distinguish 
between meaning-constituting inferences and those that are not relevant 
to the semantics of the term. Thus, it might be the case that red hair 
renders someone unloveable, on a particular perspective, but it is not 
essential to the meaning of the term. The reason, for Peacocke, is that 
the equation of red hair and unloveability is informative. It is cognitively 
significant (1992, 2). The equation, however, of unloveability with the 
incapacity for being loved is redundant. They are intersubstitutable   
 
7  For many philosophers, the specification problem is at the heart of their rejection of 
conceptual role semantics. See, for example, Stephen Schiffer’s discussion in Remnants 
of Meaning (1987, 109). It strikes me, however, that our inability to solve the specification 
problem is not clearly relevant to the acceptability of conceptual role theories in general. 
For while it might prove difficult to disentangle, for epistemic reasons, the various 
strands of a concept’s inferential relationships, our difficulty in determining these 
relationship has no bearing on whether or not they are constitutive of meaning. J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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without any change in the informativeness of the sentences in which 
they appear, and thus, on Peacocke’s theory, they are the same concept.8 
What is central to views like Peacocke’s is that there is some criterion by 
which we can delimit those inferences that are criterial for the possession 
of the concept in question. As a consequence two individuals can have 
the same concept even though the conceptual roles of their concepts are 
not the same. What must be true, however, is that both individuals are 
inclined towards the same criterial inferences.
Ned Block disagrees. He argues that the absence of an analytic/
synthetic distinction forces us to do away with what he calls “the crude 
dichotomy of same/different meaning in favour of a multidimensional 
gradient of similarity of meaning” (BLOCK, 1986, 629). Block takes Quine’s 
refutation of the analytic/synthetic distinction to imply that there are no 
purely criterial inferences. As a consequence, he cannot suppose that 
there is some select subset of a concept’s inferential properties that 
would be prerequisite for the mastery of a given concept. Instead, Block 
assumes that each of a term’s inferential properties is at least partially 
constitutive of the meaning of that term. The meaning of any concept is 
thus a function of its entire conceptual role.
The price of this ecumenism is severe, however. Conceptual 
roles are typically defined relative to other conceptual roles within a 
representational system. This is easy to see. We individuate the inferential 
role of a given sentence or thought in terms of the sentences or thoughts 
to which it is inferentially related. These sentences or thoughts are 
likewise inferentially related to others within the system. The problem 
is that what inferences one is inclined to make depends on what other 
sentences or thoughts are instantiated within the system itself. The belief 
that poverty is a sin prompts the belief that current economic policies 
are evil only as a consequence of some other belief that suggests that 
these policies promote poverty. Clearly, not everyone shares this belief, 
or indeed a multitude of others that are relevant to the inferential roles of 
these sentences and their component parts. In supposing then that all of 
the inferential properties of a given concept or sentence are relevant to 
the meaning of that concept or sentence leads one to embrace not only 
holism, the idea that the meaning of a given sentence or thought depends 
on the meanings of all other sentences and thoughts within the system, 
but also the idea that content is idiosyncratic. That is, since no two people 
share the same beliefs, no two people share the same concepts.
8  To put it another way, one can reasonably deny that unloveability and red hair go hand 
in hand, but one cannot sensibly deny that the incapacity for being loved does not go 
with unloveability. A denial of this latter claim is to give up on the concept altogether.J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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This result is potentially devastating for any theory of concepts that 
is motivated by the hope of explaining common sense psychological 
generalizations. Since no two individuals are likely to share the same 
concepts, it is unlikely that their behaviour can be subsumed under 
generalizations that advert to the contents of their beliefs or desires.
It is Block’s hope that insofar as these problems arise, they might be 
defused by an appeal to some notion of semantic similarity. After all, it 
must be noted that the vast majority of an individual’s beliefs are not 
so different than one’s neighbours. That is, most people will share basic 
sensory beliefs, and basic biological desires – not to mention, in some 
large degree, a basic agreement concerning the laws of inference that 
are to be applied to beliefs and desires. Any difference in inferential role 
must then be defined against this background of a shared intellectual 
outlook, partly biological and sensory, and partly communal. It is perhaps 
possible to define some metric of similarity that governs how we attribute 
beliefs and desires that are appropriately similar to each other. These 
laws would not be, of course, exceptionless, but of course psychological 
laws aren’t exceptionless either.
However, even if we suppose that some similarity index might be 
employed to form the backdrop against which useful and interesting 
psychological generalizations can be made, Block’s holism encounters 
difficulties on a wholly different front. The attempt to develop a theory 
of concept acquisition which at once respects his holism as well as his 
picture of evidence and learning tests his similarity metric in some rather 
serious ways. In what follows, I will first delineate Block’s account of 
concept acquisition before turning to a discussion of the ramifications 
of his holism for this view. 
B.  Cognitivism
A cognitivist theory of concept acquisition is committed to the idea 
that the majority of one’s concepts are acquired through inductive belief 
formation processes. On these views, coming to acquire a concept is 
entering into the appropriate belief state with respect to the semantic 
properties of a given concept. On some views, this has been defined 
in terms of learning specific definitions or necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the application of a given term or concept, but there 
is considerable latitude in the details of these theories to allow for 
significant disagreement. What all such cognitivist theories require, 
however, is simply that concepts are learned and that coming to possess 
a concept involves coming to have particular beliefs. 
Paradigmatically, how we learn is a function of forming and confirming 
the appropriate hypotheses (see FODOR, 1981b). Typically, an individual J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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develops a hypothesis about the meaning (or, in this case, the conceptual 
role) of a given term or concept and tests that hypothesis against the 
relevant features of their future experience. What makes such learning 
processes rational is that the relation between the hypothesis confirmed 
and the concept acquired is fundamentally an evidentiary one. The 
confirmation of the hypothesis justifies the subsequent use or application 
of the concept. 
While there has been very little attention paid to the issue of concept 
acquisition within the conceptual role semantics literature, it has been 
widely assumed that the appropriate account of concept acquisition for 
these theories would be noncognitive. Indeed, proponents of concept 
role theories have been very careful to disassociate themselves from the 
standard learning models of concept acquisition. The reason for this has 
been twofold. In the first place, since the acquisition of a given concept 
amounts to nothing more than acquiring a certain functional or inferential 
organization, it has been thought that there is no need to take on any 
additional explanatory commitments involving the possible avenues by 
which this organization is achieved. What matters is thus not how we 
come to acquire a certain inferential organization, but rather whether such 
an organization adequately describes the relevant semantic relationships. 
The second concern stems from the identification of conceptual role 
theories with what have been called use theories of meaning. On these 
views, to acquire a concept is not to come to learn a definition or what it 
stands for, but rather it is the acquisition of a sort of inferential capacity 
or ability. The distinction between knowing how and knowing that has 
often been invoked to underscore this distinction (a distinction that has 
now met with some serious skepticism, see STANLEY and WILLIAMSON, 
2001). Acquiring an ability, like riding a bike, does not require the mastery 
of any set of propositions, but rather the acquisition of a particular set 
of abilities or capacities. On this model, a concept is perceived as a sort 
of skill and it is, as a consequence, no more definable or cognitively 
accessible than the skills of great home run hitters (see, for example, 
LEWIS, 1990, 519; DEVITT, 1996, 52).
The move to a noncognitive, nonrational approach to concept 
acquisition provides the conceptual role theorist with a convenient 
solution to the problems raised by what Fodor has called “the standard 
argument” (FODOR, 1981b). The standard argument suggests that 
any rational learning model of concept acquisition is committed 
to the view that at least some, and in Fodor’s view, quite possibly 
most, concepts are innate. The argument turns on the fact that the 
formation of any hypothesis will require, on some level, a specification 
of its contents in terms of concepts which are already available to the J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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subject. These concepts, at least initially, cannot be learned in the 
usual way. 
However, noncognitivism offers a putative means to avoid the 
most damaging of Fodor’s conclusions by giving an account of concept 
possession and acquisition that does not depend on rational learning 
strategies. On this view, since concepts are acquired through feedback 
mechanisms which constitute neither evidence nor justification for how 
that concept is used, there is no presumption that acquisition proceeds 
through hypothesis testing procedures and hence no demands for a 
proprietary language in which to couch those hypotheses. If we assume, 
as many conceptual role semanticists do, that acquiring a concept is 
akin to acquiring a skill or a knack, then one can offer a genitive theory 
of concepts that does not presuppose any innate conceptual repertoire. 
That is, since acquiring a concept is a form of learning how, rather than 
learning that, it is no longer apparent that such views fall prey to the 
standard argument’s conclusion.
This argument is, however, only as satisfying as our story of 
noncognitivist concept acquisition, and it is not clear that we have one of 
those. For even if the demands of hypothesis testing and confirmation no 
longer apply, we nevertheless lack any robust sense of what mechanisms 
a noncognitivist theory of concept acquisition does require. Fodor has 
argued that while we might plausibly maintain that learning-how 
does not require hypothesis testing, there remain some good reasons 
to suppose that it might after all (FODOR, 1998, 124-125). We are, if 
anything, less prepared to offer a fully-fledged theory of noncognitive 
concept acquisition than we are for the impoverished cognitive side. If 
the noncognitivist believes that learning-how might afford us a sort of 
back door out of the standard argument, it is not obvious that he has a key. 
And Block wants to go through the front door. Block’s holism is 
unusual in supposing that a cognitivist learning theory is required by 
conceptual role semantics, but in light of the concerns raised above, a 
direct, rational, approach to concept acquisition offers some distinct 
advantages. However, even granting this, we must acknowledge that 
such a theory cannot be complete, for at some level it presupposes that 
there are some concepts available for forming the requisite hypotheses. 
The genesis of these concepts cannot be explained in recourse to rational 
learning strategies. As a consequence, the approach Block advocates 
here cannot be the sole story of concept acquisition for a conceptual role 
theorist. Some concepts must be acquired outside of rational learning 
strategies, either in the manner of skills or physical capacities (provided 
this can be worked out) or as a consequence of the development of innate 
conceptual roles.J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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Despite this, there are some advantages to adopting even a partially 
cognitivist theory of concept acquisition. For what does seem true is that 
what concepts an individual possesses is a function of their educational 
and experimental background. Insofar as we acquire evidence for our 
beliefs, we also, it seems, increase our capacity to consider them. We 
might say growth in knowledge correlates very well with the growth in 
the breadth and complexity of one’s conceptual repertoire. For example, 
the concepts that are available to a physicist in his or her description of 
the universe seem to arise as a consequence of his or her directed study 
into those specific domains of discourse. The same is no less true in other 
disciplines, inside and out of the sciences. The concept, for example, of 
a FAKEY comes most easily to those who are versed in skateboarding, 
while the concept F-STOP is usually mastered only by those who possess 
the appropriate collateral knowledge within photography. Indeed, 
possession of the appropriate collateral knowledge is often taken to be 
criterial for ascription of concepts of specific sorts. The physicist does 
not, so it seems, acquire the knack for thinking about quarks, so much as 
the requisite propositional knowledge. What noncognitivist theories often 
lack is any way of explaining the relationship between what an agent 
knows and the concepts he or she possesses. As a consequence, Block 
might rightly assume that a conceptual role theory that is compatible 
with a cognitivist account of concept acquisition gains a measure of 
empirical plausibility. The opposite also seems true. Theories of concept 
acquisition which cannot account for the interrelationship between what 
an individual knows and what concepts they possess become more 
questionable on precisely these grounds.9
The substance of Block’s theory, developed largely in reaction to 
Fodor’s version of the standard argument, is that concepts are acquired not 
through the formation of speculative definitions, subsequently confirmed, 
but rather through the formation and confirmation of hypotheses 
concerning the functional role of specific terms or concepts.10 He writes,   
 
9  The same advantages accrue to cognitivist theories of concept possession. For on this 
view, the conceptual role of a term is determined by the set of inferences in which it 
participates. However, the inferences to which a concept or term makes a contribution 
will depend, at least in part, on the collateral knowledge that the subject possesses. 
As Fodor points out, “you can’t identify a dog by its barking unless you know(/believe) 
that dogs bark.” And, “surely, you won’t infer from dog to animal unless you know(/
believe) that dogs are animals” (1998, 125). 
10  Block does not address the question of how it is that hypotheses about conceptual roles 
are confirmed, but one could imagine that such an hypothesis is confirmed, in the case of 
natural language terms, by comparing one’s usage of that term against its employment 
by others. The story is apt to be different for concepts that are not acquired concurrently 
with equivalent expressions in natural language. One could imagine, however, that these 
hypotheses are tested against instances of the properties they are meant to represent. J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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“to the extent that hypotheses are involved, they are hypotheses about 
how a term functions in thought, reasoning, problem solving and so 
forth”(BLOCK, 1986, 647). Since these hypotheses are meant to capture 
the conceptual role of a given term or concept, they appear to avoid the 
consequences of Fodor’s standard argument. Since the conceptual role of 
a term catalogs the inferential relationships in which a term participates, 
we might suppose that it offers something very much like a definition 
of the term in question. However, Block maintains that this view is 
misguided. Insofar as conceptual roles chart the function of a term or 
concept in thought, they do not straightforwardly correspond to standard 
conceptions of definitions.
Block makes his case for this model through the use of an example. 
He notes that in acquiring the concepts of elementary physics, he did not 
learn definitions of the terms, but rather he learned how to use the new 
terminology. “I learned certain relations among the new terms themselves 
(e.g., the relation between force and mass, neither of which can be defined 
in old terms) some relations between old terms and new terms, and, most 
importantly, how to generate the right numbers in answers to questions 
posed in the new terminology” (BLOCK, 1986, 648). Block invokes Lewis’s 
functional definitions as a model of what is acquired in this learning 
process (see LEWIS, 1980). We do not learn a static definition of what a 
term means, an analysis into other more fundamental terms, but rather 
an explication of the role of a term within a theory. 
If Block avoids the charge that he is in actuality presupposing that 
terms can be given the sorts of definitions Fodor finds objectionable 
(and it is not clear that he does), it nevertheless remains clear that the 
account he is offering is cognitive in character. Block supposes that we 
can come to acquire new concepts by learning the role of a given term 
within a larger theory, where the mechanisms for picking out this role are 
themselves cognitive. We form hypotheses about the role of, say, QUARKS 
within the larger theory of quantum mechanics. Whether we perceive 
these hypotheses as definitions in the classical sense is debatable, but 
it is clear that in forming hypotheses we are employing concepts that 
we antecedently possess. These hypotheses are subsequently confirmed 
or disconfirmed and through this feedback mechanism we alter our 
hypotheses accordingly. 
What makes Block’s view unusual, as a conceptual role semanticist, 
is his acceptance of Fodor’s contention that hypothesis formation 
and confirmation currently constitute the only plausible model of the 
mechanism underlying cognitive theories of concept learning and 
acquisition (BLOCK, 1986, 647). However, he does deny the attendant 
claim that in acquiring concepts we must form definitions in terms of J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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concepts we already possess. There are two reasons for this denial. 
As we have already seen, the hypotheses confirmed are not traditional 
definitions. In forming hypotheses we speculate on the role of a term 
within a given theory, not on its dictionary definition. More importantly, 
perhaps, Block suggests that in acquiring new concepts or terms we 
often employ terms with which we are only marginally familiar. It is 
often the case that the fundamental causal or inferential relationships 
relevant to acquiring a new term involve the concurrent acquisition of 
other terms. One cannot acquire the concept ‘momentum’ without the 
concept of ‘acceleration’, nor perhaps ‘bachelor’ without the concept 
of ‘marriage’. Some terms are learned holistically, in conjunction with 
a family of largely inferentially interdefinable terms. However, even if 
this is often the case, it is nevertheless apparent that it is central to 
distinguishing and demarcating the functional roles of these terms to 
frame them, and the relationships that exist between them, in terms that 
are already understood.
C.  Can there be a holistic cognitivism?
Block’s theory is thus at once holistic and cognitive in character. He 
holds that the inferential relations (or liaisons, as they are sometimes 
called) of a given concept cannot be divided into essence and accident, 
and as a consequence each of the inferences in which a concept 
participates is partially constitutive of its meaning. However, since 
the inferential liaisons of a given concept are inextricably tied to the 
inferential relationships of a multitude of other concepts, and these with 
a multitude of others, it appears that the meaning of one concept is likely 
to be a function of a good many if not all of the others. This is the sum 
of Block’s holism.
What his cognitivism requires, however, is more complex. For his 
supposition that new concepts are acquired through rational learning 
strategies presupposes a confirmation relation between a given hypothesis 
and the concept whose functional role the hypothesis describes. A 
confirmation relation is, at bottom, an epistemic relation between two 
sentences or propositions. As a consequence, the development of any 
hypothesis will require that the agent employ, at some level of description, 
some (and quite possibly all) of the concepts that he has previously 
acquired. 
If the combination of these two doctrines, holism and cognitivism, 
helps deflect criticisms of conceptual role semantics by tying the rational 
acquisition of concepts to increases in general levels of knowledge, it 
nevertheless introduces new tensions that are unique to this approach. 
These emerge when we consider the nature of the hypotheses that are J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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employed in acquiring new concepts. Notice that Block is committed to the 
view that insofar as each hypothesis employs concepts that the individual 
already possesses, it potentially employs every concept that the individual 
has. This is a consequence of his holism. If he accepts the general claim 
that each of a concept’s inferential liaisons is partially constitutive of 
the meaning of a given term or concept, then it becomes clear that any 
hypothesis will involve all of the concepts which participate in those 
liaisons. In the limiting case, this is every concept that the individual 
possesses (see FODOR & LEPORE, 1992, for a version of this argument).11 
The problem for Block is simply this: if the meaning of every concept 
is a function of every other concept within a given conceptual system, 
then the acquisition of a new concept will change the meaning of the 
concepts in the confirmed hypothesis. The meaning of the concepts in 
the hypothesis are a function of the inferential liaisons they shared with 
each of the other concepts that the individual possessed prior to acquiring 
the new concept. Once a new concept passes through the confirmation 
regimen12, each of the old terms acquires new inferential liaisons – that is, 
new inferential roles with respect to the concept acquired. This changes 
the meaning of each of the terms that comprised the hypothesis – and 
each of the terms to which they were inferentially related. On any holistic 
view, of course, this is all of them. 
What this suggests is that the hypothesis which was confirmed 
in the acquisition of the new concept is literally inexpressible in the 
conceptual system in which the new concept exists. The reason should 
be clear. Block’s holism requires that the inferential role of any concept 
be a function of its inferential liaisons with each of the concepts within 
the system. However, with the addition of a new concept or concepts, the 
inferential liaisons of each of the pre-existing concepts must expand to 
include their inferential relations with the new concept and the changes 
in inferential relationships that stem from its inclusion within the system. 
As a consequence, the inferential role that the hypothesis embodied no 
longer exists within the system itself.
11  Some have argued for what has been called a molecular conceptual role holism, which 
suggests that concepts divide into relatively broad categories in which inferential roles 
are co-determinative of the meaning of the concepts within those categories. Logical 
terms and concepts might, as we have seen, constitute one plausible candidate for a 
molecular or indeed might the concepts of physics and chemistry. Certainly, within 
these categories, there is an acceptance of a limited holism, but shy of a complete theory 
of conceptual role we cannot know the substance of the claim that these inferentially 
isolated islands of meaning might avoid the objections I raise here.
12  This confirmation regimen will depend on a number of factors – the complexity of 
the conceptual role in question, the conditions under which it is confirmed and their 
frequency, etc. J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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Moreover, the new concept cannot have a functional role within 
the new system which is the same as that in the confirmed hypothesis 
since the conceptual role that the hypothesis specified cannot exist in a 
conceptual system with the concept that has been acquired. The problem 
is that if we accept a hypothesis formation and confirmation account 
of concept acquisition, we must also accept that the functional role of 
the new concept is the same as the hypothesis. For the confirmation 
relation is itself an inferential relation, one which licenses inferences 
from the conceptual role of the hypothesis to the conceptual role of the 
new concept. However, the conceptual role of the hypothesis can make 
no allowances for the inclusion of the new concept without a concurrent 
change in its meaning.
What this suggests is that Block cannot simultaneously maintain a 
cognitivist view of concept acquisition while holding onto his holism. For 
what cognitivism demands is that there be some rational relationship 
between the content of the concept that is required, given by its inferential 
role, and the confirmed hypothesis. In particular, the confirmation 
relation that exists between the hypothesis and the concept acquired 
should allow one to infer from the hypothesis to the concept, for what is 
confirmed is that the hypothesis adequately or correctly characterizes the 
new concept. But there is no guarantee that this is the case as the new 
concept does not have the inferential role of the confirmed hypothesis. 
This breaks the evidentiary connection between the confirmation regimen 
and the subsequent application of the concept. As a consequence, we 
cannot suppose that the concept acquired retains the same content as 
the hypothesis.
D.  Can there be a holistic noncognitivism?
In the previous section, I argued that Block’s holism demands that 
the content of each of an individual’s concepts change in response 
to the acquisition of a new concept, while his cognitivism requires 
that the new concept retain the conceptual role of the hypothesis 
through which it was acquired. Some have argued, however, that the 
problems similar to those encountered above apply quite generally 
to any theory of concept acquisition for a holistic theory of meaning. 
As we have seen, the acquisition of any new concept will change the 
meaning of every other concept within the representational system. 
What this suggests is that there can be no incremental means of 
acquiring a concept within a holistic theory of meaning. Michael Dummett 
has made this point with respect to learning terms within a natural 
language.J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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The situation is essentially similar to that of a language all of whose 
sentences consist of single words, i.e. have no internal semantic 
structure;…it becomes unintelligible how the speakers of the language 
could ever have come to associate…senses with their unitary sentences…
In the same way, if a total theory is represented as indecomposable into 
significant parts, then we cannot derive its significance from its internal 
structure, since it has none… (DUMMETT, 1973, 599-560).
The problem is that a holistic language must, in some sense, be 
acquired all at once. Any incremental procedure would demand that 
some concepts or terms be acquired before the others. However, it is not 
clear how one can acquire a subset of a given conceptual system without 
acquiring the rest of that system at the same time. That is, if the meaning 
of any concept in a system depends on its relationships, however defined, 
with each of the other concepts in that representational system, then it 
appears impossible to acquire any of the concepts within that system 
without simultaneously acquiring all of them. 
Perhaps this explains Block’s emphasis on acquiring sets of concepts 
concurrently. “In my own case, I heard a large number of unfamiliar terms 
more or less all at once: ‘mass’, ‘force’, ‘energy’, and the like. I never was 
told definitions of these terms in terms I already knew” (BLOCK, 1995, 
402). Whether Block’s case reflects our own experience doesn’t matter. 
The overriding point here is that in acquiring a set of new concepts 
Block does not appeal to concepts that he has previously possessed. 
Instead, he argues that the acquisition of these concepts was achieved 
by systematically relating them to each other. 
It is unlikely however that a genuinely holistic theory of meaning could 
rely on such devices. How the various concepts in Block’s Newtonian 
equations are related is a function of concepts Block already possesses 
(That is to say, the hypotheses Block forms about how ‘mass’ and ‘force’ 
are related will depend on his ability to use concepts that capture that 
relation). What Block supposes, that a holist cannot, is that the meaning of 
the concepts within a given domain (in this case, Newtonian mechanics) 
are exhaustively determined by the inferential relationships between the 
concepts in that domain (He must also suppose that the relationships 
that he describes between these concepts also form a closed circle of 
interdefined terms or concepts).
We might think of it this way. There are two sets of concepts we 
need to consider here. There are those of Newtonian mechanics, which 
are defined through various operations that Block learns to perform over 
them. If he learns how to perform these operations through hypothesis 
testing and confirmation, then he is also committed to the existence of 
a set of concepts which express the nature of these relations. If these J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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latter concepts formed a closed domain, then it appears possible that 
they could be used to acquire concepts in another closed domain, 
Newtonian physics. These approaches to concept acquisition appear to 
eschew holism in favour of a more molecular approach to the semantics 
of concepts. Despite Block’s apparent, though halting, endorsement of 
holistic theories, his examples suggest that he is at least sometimes 
inclined towards a molecular conceptual role holism, which suggests 
that concepts divide into relatively broad categories in which inferential 
roles are co-determinative of the meaning of the concepts within those 
categories. Logical terms and concepts might, as we have seen, constitute 
one plausible candidate for a molecular or indeed might the concepts of 
physics and chemistry. Certainly, within these categories, there is an 
acceptance of a limited holism and the same issues recur on the smaller 
scales that the theory advances.
The smaller scale also fails the larger one. For while a molecularism 
stills face problems involving the relations between each of the terms 
within the domain, it also amounts to a denial of an overarching holism. 
What it suggests is that within a given representational system, there 
are conceptual domains which are independent of the other concepts 
within the representational system. 
E.  Whither Similarity?
The above argument is apt to seem excessively uncharitable to 
proponents of holistic theories of meaning. For what this argument 
appears to neglect is that on any incremental account of concept 
acquisition, whether it be cognitivist or otherwise, new concepts will 
effect only relatively minor changes in the meaning of the other concepts 
or terms within the system. On a conceptual role semantics, what this 
means is that while the expansion of the conceptual system will result 
in changes in the meaning of terms with which the new concepts are 
inferentially related, it will not effect wholesale revisions in the inferential 
relationships between the concepts that already exist within the system. 
What this suggests is that the meaning of the terms or concepts within 
the previous system will not be significantly altered. As a consequence, 
one might argue, conceptual role semantics can live with holism on the 
grounds that the meaning of concepts within the systems will remain 
roughly commensurate will the concepts in the system prior to the 
acquisition of a new concept or concepts. 
This view is reinforced by the relatively banal observation that the 
preponderance of our beliefs are grounded in simple experiential or 
observational terms. These concepts, which are grounded in biologically 
basic brute experiences form much of the basis of our conceptual palette J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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and they embed. These are likely to be universal, or largely so, and hence 
relatively immune to wholesale changes in our conceptual scheme. 
We find in this a second opportunity to deploy Block’s notion of 
meaning similarity in defense of conceptual role semantics. For what 
Block has suggested previously is that we must do away with the idea 
that particular concepts are to be associated with an all or nothing 
criterion for concept possession or understanding, and instead opt for 
what he calls a “multidimensional gradient of similarity of meaning” 
(BLOCK, 1998, 629). We might, then, be disposed to ascribe the same 
concept to individuals with conceptual or inferential roles that are not 
identical. Moreover, we could expect the same level of charity within an 
individual, and across concept acquisition. Thus, we needn’t expect that 
the acquisition of a new concept will, fundamentally, change the semantic 
resources available to the individual, for if we suppose that the system 
has achieved a relative degree of inferential depth and complexity13, 
then insofar as the acquisition of new concepts will result in changes 
within the inferential structure of a conceptual role semantics, these 
changes are likely to be localized largely within the conceptual domain 
of the new concept or hence inconsequential within the framework of 
the entire system.
Each of these proposals is tied to the idea that concept identity 
depends requires that both concepts share exactly the same inferential 
roles. However, public meaning may require something substantially less. 
Ingo Brigandt has argued that concept identity is defined not strictly in 
terms of their inferential roles (which may be more or less the same), 
but rather by how those roles satisfy our semantic interests. Hence, two 
concepts may be reckoned identical even if they do not share precisely 
the same inferential liaisons. How a concept is used determines the 
criterial basis for the successful application of a given concept relative to 
our interests. Brigandt writes, “these interests determine how a concept 
is to be individuated; and as the same term can be subject to different   
 
13  The point of this rider is to note that smaller conceptual systems will be subject to far 
more instability with the addition of new concepts. Children are much more likely to 
experience a paradigm shift in their conceptual growth than adults, if only because 
their conceptual system is subject to more frequent and inferentially onerous changes 
than adults. (Consider for example the child’s first steps towards making an inferential 
distinction between concepts of having and possessing and the relatively complex 
concepts of ownership and purchasing. Economic concepts postdate merely possessive 
ones, but in their acquisition they change the child’s conceptual relationship with virtually 
every object in their environment.) Nevertheless, adults possess no special immunity 
to large scale shifts in the inferential organization of their conceptual systems and as 
a consequence cannot suppose that newly acquired concepts might not threaten the 
intertranslatability of one’s current and past representational systems in serious ways. J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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philosophical studies and theoretical interests, its content may be 
individuated in different ways” (BRIGANDT, 2004, 32). Hence, a slippage 
in concept meaning can be at least partially regulated by how they serve 
our semantic interests with their public expression.
The problem remains, however, that in the absence of any specific 
proposals concerning the nature of conceptual roles, it is impossible to 
quantify the degree to which any two conceptual roles are similar. Simply 
put, if we can’t say precisely what the conceptual role of a given concept 
amounts to, then we are even harder pressed to say what it would take 
to have a conceptual role with a similar content. Moreover, even under 
such a theory, it might well remain unclear how similar two conceptual 
roles would have to be to warrant the ascription of the same concept or 
what contexts would be relevant to determining whether such ascriptions 
would be justified. The promise of conceptual role semantics will depend 
in large part on how effectively these issues can be resolved. 
These worries are not insubstantial, but despite this, the idea that two 
distinct conceptual roles may nevertheless possess roughly equivalent 
conceptual content suggests that Block’s theory of concept acquisition 
might be resurrected. Insofar as new concepts change the contents of 
other concepts within the system, such changes would not, in general, 
significantly change their meaning. However, since the acquisition of 
any new concept will still change, to whatever degree, the inferential 
roles of the concepts that compose the confirmed hypothesis, it is no 
less true that the evidentiary connection between hypothesis and the 
conceptual role acquired is broken. The concept acquired is not the sum 
of its hypothesized parts. As a consequence, even on a hypothesis testing 
model of concept acquisition, we must accept that concept learning is 
not a strictly rational process.
Despite this, insofar as this process reflects relative similarities 
between the conceptual roles that are acquired and the concepts that 
comprise the relevant hypotheses, it will remain true that concept 
acquisition will appear largely rational. We might consider the learning 
process here pseudo-rational. For new concepts will be acquired through 
what appear to be rational learning strategies. Hypotheses are formed 
and tested against experience, but the acquisition of the concept itself 
changes, in most cases we might suppose quite slightly, the conceptual 
makeup of the entire system. Indeed, if it were a regular feature of new 
concepts that they came radically apart from the confirmed hypotheses 
that led to their acquisition, we would be unlikely to pursue the same 
strategies for other concepts. Insofar a conceptual role determines 
meaning, it faces simultaneous referential demands that rational learning 
strategies effectively satisfy. Thus, no matter in how many directions the J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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new thread in the rug is pulled, its acquisition is tied specifically to the 
hole it was meant to fill. Our acquisition strategies are apt to reflect this 
concern. Hence, the “gestalt switches” expected are not the earthquakes 
that Dummett (or perhaps even KUHN, 1970) would suppose them to 
be, for while new concepts change the system, we have no reason to 
suppose that they undermine or alter in any fundamental way the overall 
inferential structure of the system.
This does not mean, of course, that such changes are in fact impossible. 
Certainly, children experience conceptual changes that radically reorient 
their conceptual understanding of the world. Perhaps Einstein’s theories 
had much the same impact within the relatively closed conceptual 
world of physicists and chemists. Thus, we must also contend with the 
possibility that the acquisition of new concepts could in fact radically 
change the existing inferential relationships within a given conceptual 
system. However, in the absence of a specific theory about the nature 
of conceptual roles, it is difficult to imagine the conditions under which 
new concepts might lead to substantive changes within a holistic 
representational system, but it seems clear that nothing about Block’s 
theory rules out such a possibility. Indeed, this is precisely why we cannot 
suppose there is a rational link between our practice of acquisition and 
the concepts that are acquired. For there is no guarantee under current 
conceptions of inferential role semantics that some new concepts will 
not dramatically alter the representational capacities of the system itself. 
Moreover, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which such changes 
could occur. Take, for example, a simple conceptual system of the sort 
Wittgenstein envisages at the start of the Philosophical Investigations 
(1953). In this language, the builder and his labourers have but four words, 
“slab”, “beam,” “block” and “pillar”. Each word is in fact a shorthand for 
a sentence, one of the sort, “bring me a slab,” or “bring me a pillar”. If 
the meaning of each term, on such a simple system, depends in part on 
the meaning of every other term in the system, then it appears likely that 
a new concept, even one conceived in terms of these existing concepts, 
will radically alter the inferential relationships between the various 
terms. And so we might find, at least for inferential role semantics, that 
size does matter. Smaller representational systems would seem more 
susceptible to a kind of discontinuous semantic development. New terms 
and concepts will have a greater impact on the inferential associations 
or relationships in smaller systems than in larger ones.
We can see evidence of this in the semantic development of children. 
They are far more likely to experience a paradigm shift in their conceptual 
growth than adults, if only because their conceptual system is more 
circumscribed and thus more subject to frequent and inferentially J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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onerous changes than adults.14 Nevertheless, this does not imply that 
adults are immune to large scale shifts in the inferential roles of their 
representational systems. However, what factors are relevant to these 
sorts of changes in adults are less obvious. 
Imagine a holistic theory of flavouring. On this view, the taste of a 
given dish is a function of each of the flavours from which it is comprised. 
The addition of new flavours will not alter the existing pattern of tastes 
(or rather the taste sensation these ingredients produce) within a dish 
even though it will change how the entire dish tastes. In the same way, 
the taste of something is not merely the sum of its parts, but rather the 
sum of these parts as a consequence of their relations to each other. We 
might be able to imagine, from consideration of the ingredients alone, 
what something might taste like, but we are often surprised, because we 
find it difficult to imagine particular flavours in combination. Consider 
for example the recent vogue of chocolate made with chili peppers. On 
paper, this is a poor match, since one is typically savory, while the other 
sweet. Despite this, these mutant taste combinations are often both 
surprising and compelling
Despite this, there are general rules for adding flavours and general 
suppositions about what something might taste like. These rules of thumb 
are usually relatively accurate about the nature of flavour combinations, 
but they needn’t always be so. Sometimes the introduction of a new 
ingredient might result in a radically new and unexpected flavor. A map 
or theory of these changes is the appropriate subject matter for food 
scientists and psychologists, and in the same way a theory about the 
sorts of inferential changes wrought by the addition of new concepts is 
the subject matter of a more robust conceptual role semantics. The size 
of the conceptual system is but only one factor within the inferential stew 
that Block is trying to assemble.
However, if we can’t predict, at least at present, what sorts of factors 
are relevant to determining the impact of a new concept or concepts 
within a conceptual system, then it seems clear that we can’t presuppose 
that there is a wholly evidentiary relationship between the hypotheses 
formed and the concepts that are acquired. The relationship between a 
concept acquired and the hypothesis from which it was confirmed cannot 
thus be divined in any straightforward manner. And what this suggests 
is that many of the criticisms that have been levied at Block’s theory have 
been misguided. In particular, Fodor has argued that rational learning 
strategies imply that the agent acquires new concepts by learning a 
definition in the form of the confirmed hypothesis. However, he notes,   
 
14  Sue Carey charts some of these differences in her (1982).J. Sarnecki – Weaving a web
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agents who have mastered the use of particular concepts are rarely able 
to define them in more basic or fundamental terms. As a consequence, 
Fodor assumes that concept learning cannot be based on rational learning 
strategies. 
What these arguments show, however, is that rational learning 
strategies can be used in the acquisition of new concepts, but that the 
addition of the new concept within the conceptual system makes the 
definition of the concept (the confirmed hypothesis) no longer expressible 
in the language of the conceptual system. We cannot give precise 
definitions solely because we no longer possess the means with which 
to give them. Nevertheless, we are able, usually, to go quite some ways 
towards expressing the meaning of the concept in other terms. This is 
precisely what we should expect on the account given above. If the old 
concepts of the hypothesis evaporate with the acquisition of the new 
concept, they nevertheless leave a residue with which we can trace out 
the broad outlines of their previous existence. 
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